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Abstract
This paper explores the effect that energy prices and market conditions have on the retirement
rates of capital goods using new micro data on aircraft lifetimes and fuel costs. The oil shocks of the
1970s made fuel intensive capital like the Boeing 707 a prime target for retirement. The results, based
on retirements of 707s from the fleets of the major airline carriers from 1972-1984 are quite robust and
show that the oil shock of 1979-1981 made the probability of retirement for a 707 between 5 and 15 times
higher. The estimated probability that a 15 year old 707-300C in 1981 would retire before 1982 was
96%. If the oil shock had not occurred this probability of retirement would have been between 8 and
14%. The potentially large effect of energy taxes on capital retirement has important implications for their
usefulness and for their potential impact on current airline fleets.
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2When economists consider policies like energy or pollution taxes, they often assume that these
policies change energy and pollution intensities by altering the utilization of assets at the micro level.
In a world with different types of capital goods and different energy or pollution intensities embodied
in those goods, however, this traditional view may be quite inaccurate. In such a world, marginal
changes in aggregate intensity may come about primarily from discrete decisions to retire inefficient
capital so the determinants of capital retirement are extremely important. This view could have a
substantial impact on our understanding of these market based instruments. Small increases in energy
taxes, for example, may have no effect on pollution or energy intensity in the short run because they
are not large enough to lead to capital retirement. Capital retirement also plays an important role in
net capital formation. The level of replacement investment depends critically on the rate of capital
retirement and Feldstein and Foot (1971) have noted that about half of total investment is really for
replacement. Despite its importance, there are remarkably few studies of capital retirement and
scrappage. Traditional studies of capital assume constant depreciation over time or a fixed service life
as in Jorgenson (1989) or Hulten (1990) and there is little work on the retirement of actual capital
goods.' A major difficulty has been identifying shocks to the relative productivity of old versus new
capital. 2
The price of fuel in the 1970s provides just such a set of shocks for the airline industry. At
their height, fuel expenses made up almost 60% of the direct operating costs for airlines and the
energy intensity of capital was embodied in the capital goods themselves (the Boeing 707 flew about
42 seat miles to the gallon while the 747, 767 and MD-80 averaged almost 70) so the retirement of
707s is an ideal place to look for the effects of fuel prices on retirement. This paper, using a new data
set on 707 life cycles and detailed carrier specific fuel cost data, shows that higher fuel costs
1 Some examples of such work are Das (1991,1992), Cockburn & Frank (1992) and Rust (1987).
2 Cockburn & Frank (1992) is an exception.
3dramatically increased the probability of retirement of 707s and increased them more for fuel
intensive 707s than for the less intensive ones.
The paper is divided into five sections. The first presents a simple theory of the optimal
retirement age of capital when there is embodied technical progress. The next section gives
background on the 707 and the airline industry (section 2). The following section describes the
specification and the data (section 3). The next presents the estimation results (section 4) and the final
section uses the results to simulate the total effect of the oil shocks on retirement (section 5). It
concludes with a brief consideration of pertinent issues raised by these findings and some directions
for further research.
SECTION I Economic Retirement: An Analytical Framework
Since market forces alter the stream of quasi-rents to an asset, it is natural to believe that
they influence the decision to retire capital. This is an old idea and there are several theoretical
models of the role of fuel prices and taxation on the optimal retirement age of capital.' Here, the
coverage will be quite stylized. In this model, there are two types of capital, the 707 and an
alternative plane. There is no uncertainty. All changes are permanent. The demand for air services is
fixed and the only costs of operation are fuel expenses. The firm currently owns one 707, with energy
intensity E which yields R in revenue in the first period and declines at rate 6 each period after that
because of physical decay. The price of energy is p. The alternative technology has the same revenue
R which declines at rate 6 starting the period after it is purchased and has energy intensity E' where
E' < E. The interest rate is r and the price of capital is q. In each period the firm must decide whether
to fly its 707, retire it or replace it. The firm receives from the 707 a stream worth current value
V(t)= RV(t)-CV(t) where
3 Some early discussions of obsolescence can be found in Solow, Tobin et al. (1966) and Phelps (1963). Some
excellent presentations of the theory of endogenous retirement are in Feldstein and Rothschild (1974), Nickell (1975)
and Malcomson (1978).
RV(t) -CV(t) = -8'/(1 +r) "*R-( +r)'*pE (1)
The 707 will remain in service until V(t)=0 at age T and then the plane is retired. The plane may be
retired before age T, however, because the airline can always replace it with the alternative plane.
This new plane will have higher revenues and lower costs, but also a purchase price of q. The firm
will switch planes if [RV(t)'-RV(t)] - [CV(t)' - CV(t)] - q > 0--in words, if the gains in revenue
plus the savings in cost from switching to a new plane exceed its purchase price. RV(t)' and CV(t)'
are for the new plane. The purchase price, q, subtracted from the net present value of the new plane.
V'(t), is plotted with V(t) in Figure 1. The two curves cross before T so the firm retires the 707 and
switches planes at age T' < T.
Figure I also allows us to explore the effect that various factors should have on the retirement
age of the 707. When the price of new capital increases, the V' - q curve falls to V'* so that the
optimal retirement age increases to T". In Figure 2 I show that when the price of energy changes,
both V and V'-q will shift to V* and V'* because the costs for both types will increase, but since
E'< E, the V' curve will shift by less-the costs of the new plane increase less because it is more fuel
efficient-so the retirement age falls. The magnitude depends on the difference between E and E'. The
larger the difference in energy intensities, the more the age falls.
These simple results motivate empirical work on the actual role that input prices and capital
costs have on retirement decisions. Before presenting the estimation, however, the nature of the
industry and the good itself will be discussed.
SECTION 2: The 707 and the airlines
The cost structure of the airlines makes them particularly sensitive to market fluctuations in
capital and fuel prices. Fuel is a major factor in airline operation. With the increase in costs, fuel
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went from about 20% of operating expenses in 1971 to almost 60% in 1981. The real price of a
gallon of jet fuel for the airlines is shown in Figure 3.
Purchasing and retiring capital is also critical to carrier performance because a single plane
can last for decades and is extremely expensive. One DC-IO, for example, cost about $60 million in
1980. The airlines themselves are aware of how important the timing of capital decisions is and
airline economics textbooks give substantial coverage to the issues of replacement and expansion
investment.' The textbooks stress the importance of forecasting future unit costs per seat mile for
various planes as well as future demand in deciding when to purchase capital. The fuel cost increases
forced airlines to rethink logistical issues--slower cruise speeds, lighter carpets and seats, shorter taxi
times-in order to reduce fuel consumption but they also raised a major question about the viability of
some capital equipment. As Table I shows, different types of aircraft have very different fuel
intensities. This is mainly due to the number of engines on the plane and the age of the engine
technology. The 707 had four old engines and most other planes had two or three newer ones. The
707 was produced from 1958-1970 as shown in Table 2 and there were two general types, the 100
series which started first and a slightly larger and generally less fuel intensive 300 series whose
production began shortly after.' The 707 was the first long range jet put into general use by airlines
and by the early 1960s the 707, the smaller B-720 and the DC-8 had replaced propeller planes in the
fleets of the major carriers. The next generation of jets including the 727, 737, 747, DC-10 and L-
1011 first arrived in the 1960s and began replacing the older jets. Most of the first generation jets
were retired rapidly but the 707 remained in service for many years. In 1971, the 707 comprised
4 For examples see Mandell (1979), James (1982) or O'Connor (1989).
s The 707-100B held 134 passengers. There were three types of 707-300 series. The original 707-300 held
149 passengers and had a turbojet engine (the JT4). The newer types, the 707-300B and -300C, had 147 passengers
and replaced the turbojet with a turbofan engine (the JT3D). The -300C was the best selling of the models and had
a cargo door for easier loading. In practice it often had fewer seats than the -300B.
almost 20% of the entire fleet of all carriers. In 1979 they still made up almost 9% of the fleet. By
1985, they were all gone. A dramatic increase in the retirements occurred around 1979-1981, and the
drop was more pronounced for the 707-100s than for the 707-300s.
The airlines had several options when retiring their 707s: they could sell them to a foreign
country, cannibalize them for parts, sell them to a cargo company, sell them to the Air Force or
withdraw them from use and put them "out to pasture" in the desert. Table 3 gives the retirement
destination for the 707s in this sample. Note that the table shows the fate of 707s when they are first
removed from the fleet only. For example, many planes were withdrawn from use and then later sold
to the Air Force for the engines but they still appear in Table 3 as withdrawn from use. One might
wonder about classifying withdrawals as retirements when airlines might have been mothballing them
until more profitable conditions arose. In no case, however, in the entire 12 year sample was a 707
brought back into major airline service and this has been a common way to dispose of planes. In
addition, results presented later indicate that fuel prices affect both types of retirement identically.
SECTION 3: Data and empirical specification
3.1 Empirical Specification
To estimate the effect that the covariates, x, have on the decision to retire capital, this study uses a
hazard model which estimates the time to failure (retirement) of an individual plane. It is absolutely
critical to have micro data on individual planes to study retirement. A standard regression of the share
of the 707 stock retired in a year on a series of annual variables without any information on the ages
of the individual planes would be unidentified. Any observed pattern of retirement which could be
explained by factor price changes could also be explained by basic physical decay. The covariates
used here are not fixed for the duration of the capital good so a model with time-varying covariates is
required. The hazard function b.(alx.) is the probability that plane i will be retired at age a in time t
conditional on not having retired yet
P(asT<a+A lx,Tha) (2)h,(a x)=lim (2)
A-0 a
I adopt the common assumption that the covariates do not change the shape of this hazard function but
i nstead just shift it (proportional hazards). Clearly, some stochastic structure is required for the model
or else the hazard is degenerate-zero until the price of oil exceeds a certain level and then certain
death. Future work will place the stochastic structure in a structural model as discussed in Rust (1987)
and Das (1992) but to do so requires strong assumptions about functional forms. Instead, I use the
Cox (1972) semiparametric hazard model to estimate the effect of the covariates on service life.
treating the baseline hazard h,(t) as a nuisance parameter (in the results a standard Weibull parametric
form for the baseline hazard is also used for comparison to these semiparametric estimates). 0 can be
estimated by maximizing the partial likelihood function
exp'x0J
i E exp[xp]
(see Kalbfleisch & Prentice, 1980 for a detailed discussion of the Cox model). The x matrix here
includes the following covariates: the cost of fuel for the year, the real cost of capital times the real
price of durable goods for the year, gdp growth for the year, a dummy for deregulation after 1978, a
dummy indicating whether the firm took a loss in the year, a variable for anti-noise regulation, and a
general measure of the intensity of use (the average flight length for the carrier in the year).
3.2 Data and Identification Strategy
The Aviation Data Centre's Airliner Production List tracks, by tail and registration number,
8each 707 ever produced, from its first flight, through changes of ownership and operating status to its
final retirement. The sample here includes every 707 in the service of major carriers in 1972
excluding planes crashed, lost or destroyed in terrorist incidents. The carriers operating 707s in 1972
were American, Northwest, TWA, Pan-American, Braniff, Western and Continental. The sample
includes 354 707s: 96 707-100s and 258 707-300s (107 300Bs, 130 300Cs, and 21 300s). This gives
2717 plane-years of observation. Since there were some planes retired before 1972, there could be
sample selectivity problems, i.e. the inferior planes were gone before 1972, but this is not as
important here as it is in other contexts.6 Since no planes survived past 1984, censoring is not an
issue. Retirement occurs when the plane is taken out of the service of a major carrier. Actually, many
of the planes are sold to foreign airlines and some to non-airline business in the U.S. Technically this
prevents identification of a pure, fuel induced change to the absolute level of quasi-rent on the old
asset and instead shows the change in relative levels of quasi-rent streams for the airlines and the next
best use.' I will assume that this outside demand is not related to the price of fuel to get around this
issue but this should actually understate the effect fuel has on retirement because the high fuel prices
probably decreased the demand for used 707s.
The hazard estimation also requires fuel price data. This study uses both the annual price of
fuel for the industry and a very rich data set kept by the Civil Aeronautics Board called the Airline
Operating Cost and Performance Report. Every carrier was required to report, for each type of plane
in operation, data on the amount of fuel used, cost paid per gallon, seat miles flown and many other
facts. In other words, American Airlines in 1981 reported sufficient information to calculate the fuel
cost per available seat mile (ASM) for its 707-100Bs, 707-300s, 707-300Bs and 707-300Cs in both
6 See Heckman & Singer (1986) for a detailed view of possible problems. The current analysis is not concerned
with estimating whether there is duration dependence in 707 hazards the way it might be for unemployment
durations and which would clearly be biased by selection problems.
7 I owe this observation to Dick Schmalensee.
9international and domestic use. Because different carriers have different flight speeds and route
structures and buy fuel in bulk, costs can vary substantially between firms even for the same models
in the same year. This gives us an excellent source of variation to identify the role of factor prices on
retirement. The actual construction of the fuel cost per available seat-mile data is described in
Appendix 1. Table 4 lists the average fuel cost (in 1987 cents) per available seat mile for the four
aircraft types in selected years. There is also substantial variation between carriers among the same
planes. Take the 300C as an example, Figure 4 plots the fuel costs for carriers operating the 300C.
Some of the specifications will use only the annual price of fuel in case the variation between carriers
in the detailed fuel cost data does not reflect the marginal cost facing the carriers or is caused for
some other reason than fuel price changes. Because there are other potential factors correlated with
this simple time-series variation, I also explore alternative explanations for accelerated retirement in
the oil shock period and use the inherent fuel intensity differences between the plane types to show
that oil matters more for the fuel intensive planes than for the others controlling for other effects. The
other specifications use the detailed fuel price data and allow for identification of the effect of fuel
costs on retirement but remain robust to alternative explanations.
SECTION 4: Results
4.1 Kaplan-Meier Hazard Estimates
Figure 5 shows the Kaplan-Meier estimate of the hazard rate for 707-100s and 707-300s. It is
simply the percentage of planes alive at a given age which retire at that age. Figure 6a and 6b show
the integrated Kaplan-Meier hazard but split each group into early and late delivery years. Clearly the
hazard rates shift over time. The planes delivered later have shorter life spans. For 707-100s, the
median retirement age of planes built before 1965 was about 18 years and after 1965 only 14 years.
For -300s the ages were 15 and 11.
The means of the variables used in the analysis are listed in Table 5 for the full sample and
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then for planes in the year they were retired and years they were not. The most pronounced
differences at first glance between retirement and non-retirement years is that the cost of fuel in
retirement years is much higher.
4.2 Cox Hazard Model Estimation: Industry Oil Price
Table 6 lists a series of Cox hazard model estimates using covariates and the annual price of
oil in the industry. This does not use the variation between carriers, only between models and over
time. The coefficients are not in hazard rate form so a one unit increase in the covariate with
coefficient b will multiply the baseline hazard by exp(b). The price of oil is scaled by the fuel
intensity in Table I for each type of 707. In column (1), oil is the only factor that shifts the hazard
rate. Its effect is large, very significant and positive indicating an increase in the instantaneous
probability of retirement. Column (2) is a more inclusive specification including the cost of capital
times the price of durable goods, gdp growth, a deregulation dummy, a noise regulation variable and
the average stage length of the carrier in the year, but the cost of capital is not significant. Column
(3) then adds a dummy variable indicating whether the carrier took a loss in the year. The cost of
capital variable is now significant and important. The loss dummy may indicate cash flow
considerations or a tax loss carryforward position but these issues will not be pursued here.' When a
lagged value of the cost of capital was included, the coefficient was insignificant, very close to zero
and did not affect the other coefficients so I exclude it. In (3), a one percent increase in the price of
oil in 1981 would increase the hazard by 2.8% for a 707-100 or 2.6% for a 707-300B. Since the Cox
estimation eliminates the baseline hazard as a nuisance parameter, we cannot calculate the actual
probability of retirement in a given year. To do that, Equation (5) estimates the same model but
fitting a Weibull parametric form for the hazard. Using the estimates from (5) and plugging into the
a For a detailed analysis of the role of carrier financial factors on retirement, including cash flow, tax-loss
carryforward positions and the cost of capital, see Goolsbee (1993).
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Weibull hazard formula gives an estimate of the hazard rate in 1981. At age 10 in 1981, a 707-100
had a hazard of .43, a 300B had a hazard of .26. If we take these estimates as the true hazard in
1981, the coefficients from the Cox estimation in (3) imply that a 10% increase in the price of oil in
1981 would have increased the hazard of 100s from .43 to .56 and for the 300B from .26 to .33.
Equation (4) includes dummies for the model type to account for model fixed effects. In this case the
price elasticities of the hazard were slightly smaller than in (3), 2.4 and 2.2, indicating that the 10%
increase in 1981 would have increased the 100's hazard from .43 to .54 and the 300B's from .26 to
.32. A higher cost of new capital lowers the hazard. Faster gdp growth, meant to proxy for airline
demand, also reduces the probability of retirement of 707s because high demand forces firms to use
whatever capital they have on hand. Deregulation has no effect on retirement rates.
4.3 Potential Alternative Causes of Retirement
The two main potential problems with the specifications above are the Air Force purchase
program and anti-noise regulations. After a discussion of these two alternatives are specifications
which remove their effects.
HYPOTHESIS I: AIR FORCE PURCHASE PROGRAM
The USAF operated (and continues to operate) many derivatives of the 707 including KC-135
stratotankers, E-3A (AWACs) for radar detection and VC-137s for transporting VIPs. In the 1980s,
the Air Force decided to put JT3D turbofan engines on its KC-135 tankers which were using less
powerful J57 turbojets. To do so, the Air Force simply bought a large number of former airline 707s
and cannibalized them for their engines and parts. This could potentially bias the results since
estimation of the effects of covariates on retirement assumes that airlines would sell no plane before
its time. If the Air Force exogenously bought 707s before they were at a 'ripe' retirement age and
purchased them at the same time the price of fuel was high, fuel might erroneously seem important.
The engine retrofit program, however, did not begin until 1982 and the airlines, generally,
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did not retire the planes just because the Air Force was buying. The Air Force was buying because
the airlines were getting rid of the planes and they thought it would be a less inexpensive way to get
the engines for their planes. It was certainly cheaper than purchasing an entirely new plane like the
proposed 707-700 which was never developed.' A large fraction of the planes bought in the KC-135E
program were already withdrawn from use when they went to the USAF.
A simple way to see that the Air Force is not driving the results is to compare the retirement
rates of USAF versus non-USAF 707s. If the USAF had purchased planes before their natural
retirement age, then the survival probabilities of the non-USAF planes should be higher than the
USAF ones. Yet the two rates are basically the same. The USAF bought 101 planes, 65% by 1982
and 93% by 1983. Of the non-USAF planes, 79% were retired by 1982 and 95% by 1983. More
formal evidence is presented in Table 6 column (6) where the specification of equation (3) is repeated
but without the planes that ended in the USAF program. The fuel coefficient is even larger than in (3)
but is not significantly different. The results are basically identical so I treat the Air Force as a
standard type of retirement.
HYPOTHESIS II: ANTI-NOISE REGULATION
During the same period as the oil shocks of the late 1970s and early 1980s, stringent anti-
noise regulations went into effect which could have caused the accelerated retirement of 707s.10 The
707 with its four large engines was an extremely loud airplane. New York Idlewild airport (now JFK)
first instituted noise limits and monitoring systems in the 1960s because of complaints from
surrounding communities about the 707's loud whine. Using measurements of the noise level on the
dB scale (where the threshold of human pain is at 120 dB, a diesel freight train around 100 dB and
9 For some discussion of the KC-135E program and of the various military and civilian 707 models see Lloyd
(1987) or Wright (1990).
10 For a summary of all domestic and international noise regulation as well as a history of their enactment,
see Smith (1989) or Panzarella (1979).
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someone yelling at about 85 dB) the take off noise of a 707 is around 104 dB. The 727, 737, DC-10
and L-1011, on the other hand, are all below 90 dB. Only the Concorde is louder.
The first major federal regulation reducing airplane noise was F.A.R. 36, passed in 1969. It
limited the production of new aircraft whose noise exceeded federal standards. The regulation spelled
the end of the main production line of 707s. The next important regulation that affected the 707 was
the F.A.R. 91-136 compliance rule, passed in 1976 which extended the standards to existing aircraft
and meant the end of the 707 in US airline fleets. A compliance scheduled was drafted which required
25% of the 707s to be removed from service by 1981, 50% by 1983 and 100% by 1985. To account
for FAR 91-136, a variable which rises to 25 in 1981 and 50 in 1983 to represent the noise regulation
is included in the specifications below. The variable is significant, but it should be noted that in fact,
50% of the planes were gone by 1981, and almost 90% were gone by 1983 even though only 25%
and 50% were required.
4.4 Natural Experiment with Year Dummies
One way to remove the effects of noise regulation and of air force purchases would be to
include year dummies. If the alternative hypotheses affect all the planes equally, their influence would
be washed out in the dummies. Unfortunately, this is impossible if the price of oil is also an annual
variable. To get around this without simply using the carrier fuel cost data, I use the inherent
difference in fuel economy between the different 707 models to indicate the role of fuel in retirement.
The 707-100B and -300 were generally more fuel intensive than the 707-300B and -300C. By dividing
the sample into these two groups and then interacting the group dummies with year dummies, this
estimation allows comparison of the two groups' retirement behavior over time. Since the noise
regulation affected all the 707s, the year dummies of the two groups should not be systematically
different on its account. If oil is the cause, however, the year dummies for the fuel intensive group
should be larger than for the other group following the oil shock in 1979 indicating that fuel intensive
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707s are more likely to retire in those years than non-intensive ones. There is clear evidence that fuel
intensive planes retired more rapidly than non-fuel intensive ones. The average year dummy for the
fuel intensive group was -1.35 from 1972-1979 and 1.72 after 1979 while the less fuel intensive
group averaged -0.10 from 1972-79 and 1.43 after (the same pattern holds when vintage dummies are
included in the estimation). Using only annual variation in fuel costs, this is the strongest evidence
possible showing that factor price changes accelerated retirement.
4.5 Robust Results: Detailed Fuel Cost Data
There are, of course, many potential problems with using only the annual variation in fuel
costs. It may not reflect the actual prices paid by the major carriers who often face different prices
from one another. Further, since the planes' fuel intensities may change over time, the adjustments
using 1975 fuel intensities may be inappropriate for other years. Fortunately, if the more detailed data
set on fuel costs is used, robust identification of the fuel effect on retirement is possible. Table 7
presents estimation using this real cost of one seat mile in 1987 cents. Column (1) presents a
specification allowing only the fuel cost to shift the hazard. It is large and highly significant. (2)
presents the full specification. Because the stage length is not exogenous to the plane's fuel cost per
mile the way it was to the average price of jet fuel, these specifications exclude it. The results are
larger than the previous ones. The real price elasticities for the 100 and 300Bs' hazards in 1981 were
2.8 and 2.6 using the annual oil price. Using fuel cost per mile, the fuel price elasticities are both
3.3. In equation (4) I again do a Weibull specification to get a baseline hazard to compare to. Here,
the 1981 hazard of a 10 year old 707 is .44 for the 100 and .38 for the 300B. A 10% increase in the
price of fuel in 1981 would raise the instantaneous probability of retirement from .44 to .61 for the
100 and from .38 to .52 for the 300B. Column (3) excludes the withdrawn from use planes to
determine if this is a different kind of retirement. None of the coefficients are significantly different
so we treat the withdrawn planes as standard retirements.
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The cost of capital is also important. In a world of no property taxation, a corporate income
tax rate of 35% and full depreciation deductions on investment over the life of the good, introducing
an investment tax credit would reduce the effective rate of taxation on capital income by ITC/ (1-7. )
So a 10% tax credit would increase the 707 hazard, at the mean cost of capital, by 72%. A 10 year
old 300B's hazard, for example, would increase from .38 to .66 in 1981.
The most important results, however, using the new fuel prices come from (5) and (6).
Including year dummies to take out all annual variation still allows estimation of fuel cost on
retirement. Equation (5) includes model dummies and year dummies. Equation (6) also includes
vintage dummies. In both cases, the role of fuel costs is much larger than before. The price
elasticities of the hazard for the 100 and 300B in 1981 are now between 3.8 and 5.0 rather than
around 3. These results are robust to the problems of excluded hazard shifters like noise regulation
and USAF purchases. This is extremely important. The year dummies will take into account all
factors which influence retirement of 707s generally. To spoil the estimates of (5) and (6) requires an
omitted factor which is correlated with the price of fuel, causes more fuel intensive planes to retire
faster than less fuel intensive planes and also causes 707 models of high fuel cost carriers to retire
faster than identical models of low fuel cost carriers. I will use the estimates from (5) and (6) in the
simulations below.
One consideration to note about the fuel results presented is that airlines can change utilization
of their planes as well as retire them so the coefficients on fuel are probably underestimated. For
example, a carrier might have retired a 707 in 1980 if used on a full route structure but by reducing
utilization, retirement could wait until 1982.11 The CAB data shows this quite clearly. For instance,
In 1973, the average 707-100 flew 8.39 hours per day at 463 miles per hour. In 1981, the same plane
flew 4.75 hours a day at 444 mph. Similarly, the 300B flew 9.36 hours a day at 481 mph in 1973 and
1i Berndt and Wood (1985) discuss the issue of energy induced changes in utilization in detail.
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4.62 hours at 450 mph in 1981. As a result, the fuel economy for the 100 and 300B planes increased
from 33.8 and 37.9 ASM per gallon in 1973 to 42.2 and 48.0 ASM per gallon in 1981. To give an
idea of the effect this has on retirement rates, consider a reduction in the fuel economy of 707-300Bs
in 1981 to their 1973 level. This would have increased the fuel cost per seat mile from 2.69 cents to
3.41 cents. The hazard would be more than two and a half times larger.
SECTION 5: Oil Shock Simulations
To consider the role that the oil shocks of 1974-5 and 1979-81 had on retirement rates, I take
the hazard estimates from the Weibull specification as the actual retirement probabilities in 1975 and
1981 and ask what would have happened to the hazard rate if the price of oil had returned to its 1973
or 1978 pre-shock level, according to the Cox estimates above. The results in Table 8 show how
decisive the price of oil was. The estimates indicate that the oil shock made retirement in 1974 about
2 to 3 times more likely and in 1981 about 5 to 15 times more likely. Take the example of the 707-
300C. A plane that reached age 15 in 1981 had a 96% chance of retiring before 1982. Without the oil
shock, the hazard would have been about 12%. These results say that the fuel shocks made 707s an
obsolete vehicle basically overnight. As might be expected, the magnitude of this effect was well
known to the airline industry. Air Transport World, the trade publication for Airline managers, ran
several editorials on the fact that 707s had become obsolete and in 1981 claimed that fuel economy
had "become an obsession" and was leading to the rapid retirement of 707s. American Airlines took
out full page advertisements offering their 707s for sale and the owner of the first 707 even offered to
sell it as a museum piece.
Another way to simulate the effect of fuel increases on retirement is to consider the effective
service life of an airplane under different fuel prices. It is common in empirical work to assume that
aircraft have a useful service life that is fixed at 14 or 18 years. If, however, the true service life
changes substantially when factor prices change, then this empirical work can be quite inaccurate. The
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service life calculation is particularly easy using the Weibull specification even though the results are
smaller than for the Cox specification. The Weibull indicates that a plane facing constant gdp growth
of 2.5% per year and a constant cost of capital at the average level would have an expected service
life of 22 years at the 1973 fuel price. At the 1978 fuel price, though, the expected service life would
be 16 years and at the 1981 price only 8 years.
The sheer magnitude of fuel's effect on retirement has important implications for the fleets of
current airlines. Although planes as fuel intensive as the 707 are gone, Table I showed that there
were equally large differences in intensity among existing planes. A common plane with poor fuel
economy today is the 727. The difference in 1975 between the 707-300, the most fuel intensive plane
in the sample, and the 727-200 was about the same as the difference between the 727-200 and the 737
today. If the 727 behaved exactly as a 707-300, for example, a 5% energy tax in 1994 could lead to
as much as a 15% increase in the retirement hazard, creating unexpected capital replacement costs for
the airlines forced to retire their fuel intensive capital. This also means that some carriers could be
more susceptible to such a tax than others. Table 9 shows the share of 727s in the total fleet size
(including planes on order). An energy tax on airlines might cause large windfall losses for some
carriers, particularly TWA, Continental and United who would suddenly find a large fraction of their
capital stock obsolete. The effect of fuel on retirement might also be important in areas like pulp
mills, steel mills, generators and automobiles, where energy intensities are embodied in the capital
goods themselves and are not easy to change ex post.
CONCLUSION
This study has shown that the price of fuel has a substantial effect on the decision to retire jet
aircraft. The oil shocks increased the probability of retirement for 707s dramatically-between 5 and
15 times in 1979-81. Reducing the cost of capital also accelerates retirement. A natural modelling
extension for this research would be to include uncertainty as in Dixit & Pindyck (1993) or Das
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(1992) and to estimate a structural model of the retirement decision.
More important, however, the large effects of fuel on retirement found here have important
implications for the other areas of research. If the oil shocks increased obsolescence in other
industries the way they did for the airlines, then the measured capital stock is too large and this could
help explain the productivity slowdown (see Baily 1981). Further, large effects of factor prices on
retirement rates of inefficient capital could change our view of market based instruments like energy
or pollution taxes. Since the capital stock of the economy is not homogenous but is instead filled with
many different types of capital assets, the most important mechanism that market instruments have
may be their effect on discrete decisions to purchase or retire assets rather than on marginal changes
in utilization as is most commonly assumed. Understanding this adjustment mechanism of price based
policies is vital for their practical use.
Table 1: Fuel EMciency of Aircraft Models
(Available Seat Miles per Gallon)
Aircraft Tpe 1983
B-767-200 71.1 -
B-757-200 70.9 --
MD-80 68.4 -
B-747 64.6 52.9
DC-10-10 61.6 51.8
A300-B4 60.2 -
B-737-200 58.3 41.1
L-1011 55.1 47.8
B-727-200 50.2 39.7
DC-8-61 50.0 44.8
707-300B 42.5 40.2
B-707-300C -- 38.5
B-707-100B -- 37.2
B-707-300 -- 35.2
Source: Airline Operating Costs and Performance Report
Table 2: Production of 707s
YEARS 707-100s 707-300s
1958-61 30 22
1962-64 24 36
1965-67 36 109
1968-70 6 91
Source: Airliner Production List, Aviation Data Centre
Table 3: Retirement Fate of 707 Aircraft
FATE NUMBER PERCENTAGE
Sold to Foreign Operator 152 42.8 %
Withdrawn from Use 101 28.4 %
Sold directly to USAF 49 13.8 %
Sold to Private/Cargo Use 42 12.1 %
ScrMed/Cannibalized 10 2.8%
TOTAL 354 100%
I I6
Table 4: Fuel Cost in 1987 cents/seat-mile for plane types
1972 1.10 .88 .82 .82
1975 1.90 1.53 1.68 1.71
1978 1.86 1.67 1.70 1.64
1981 3.69 3.02 3.22 2.89
1984 - 2.11 - 2.02
Table 5: Variable Summary
(standard deviation in parentheses)
Variable
Name
Delivery Year
Exit Year
Duration
(years)
Industry Price of Oil Index
(707-100 in 1978= 1.00)
Fuel cost of 1 seat mile
(1987 cents)
Loss dummy
GDP growth
Capital Price Index
(1987= 100)
Cost of capital
in %
Average Stage Length
Full
Sample
1965.6
(3.0)
1980.1
(2.5)
14.4
(3.6)
.91
(.40)
1.69
(.68)
.40
(.49)
2.74
(2.60)
117.0
(6.0)
20.2
(1.73)
991
(471)
Retirement
Years
1965.3
(3.1)
1978.7
(3.2)
13.4
(3.9)
1.29
(.47)
2.30
(.73)
.41
(.49)
1.84
(2.53)
113.2
(5.6)
21.6
(2.0)
962
(405)
Non-retirement
years
1965.7
(2.9)
1980.3
(2.3)
14.6
(3.5)
.86
(.36)
1.60
(.62)
.40
(.49)
2.88
(2.58)
117.5
(5.8)
20.0
(1.6)
995
(480)
I
Table 6: Estimates of Cox Model for 707 retirement hazard-using industry oil price
(Standard errors in parentheses)
Vars. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)12 (6)
Weibull No usaf
Price of oil 1.612 1.428 1.452 1.276 1.560 1.705
(.1577) (.3291) (.3272) (.3415) (.4698) (.3368)
Cost of capital * -.0003 -.0014 -.0015 -.0033 -.0009
price (.0005) (.0005) (.0006) (.0002) (.0006)
Loss dummy -1.136 -9519 -1.300 -.7904
(.1429) (.1464) (.2106) (.1451)
GDP growth rate -.0461 -. 1496 -. 1530 -.2444 -.0941
(.0322) (.0357) (.0363) (.0306) (.0378)
Deregulation dunmmy -.2624 .2173 .1913 .3149 -.0656
(.2808) (.2690) (.2790) (.2953) (.2862)
Noise regulation .0277 .0277 .0255 .0177 .0201
variable (.0053) (.0054) (.0056) (.0070) (.0063)
Stage length .0005 .0006 .0004 .0005 .0004
(.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0010) (.0002)
Sigma .4300
(.0421)
Model Dumies No No No Yes No No
Pseudo-R2 .0331 .0047 .0644 .0791 .0568
Log Likl. -1704.8 -1659.2 -1649.7 -1623.7 -889.3 -1391.1
12 The Weibull coefficients listed are in fact the estimated coefficients divided by the estimated a scale
parameter so as to be comparable with the Cox estimates. Since the scale parameter is estimated itself these standard
errors are nderestimted.
Table 7: Estimates of Cox Model for 707 retirement hazard-using ASM fuel cost
(Standard errors in parentheses)
Vars. (1) (2) (3) (4)13 (5) (6)
No wfu Weibull
Price of oil .9989 1.083 1.041 1.143 1.232 1.629
(.0923) (.1692) (.1943) (.2560) (.3539) (.3823)
Cost of capital * -.0015 -.0012 -.0033
pri (.0005) (.0006) (.0002)
Loss dmnmy -1.133 -1.163 -1.297 -1.261 -1.171
(.1461) (.1817) (.0193) (.1699) (.1727)
GDP gowth rate -. 1396 -.0963 -.2310
(.0364) (.0401) (.0301)
Daegulouan dummy -.0503 -.2462 .1552
(.2576) (.3360) (.2629)
Noise rqulation .0331 .0339 .0252
riable (.0051) (.0065) (.0075)
Sigma .4286
(.0401)
Model Dunmies No No No No Yes Yes
Year Dmmies No No No No Yes Yes
Vintage Dummies No No No No No Yes
Pseudo-R2 .0361 .0684 .0543 .0884 .0543
Log Llki. -1699.5 -1642.5 -1110.0 -877.0 -1607.3 -1110.0
13 The Weibull coefficieats listed are in fact the estimated coefficients divided by the estimated a scale
parameter so as to be comparable with the Cox estimates. Since the scale parameter is estimated itself these standard
errors are underetimated.
Table 8: Effect of Oil Shocks on Estimated Retirement Probabilities
Table 9: Fuel Efficiency of Current Fleets
Carrier 727s Fleet
(%) Size
TWA 35.2 210
Continental 28.6 325
United 26.1 482
Delta 23.2 660
American 21.9 750
Northwest 13.8 515
USAir 6.7 436
Southwest 0.0 162
Appendix 1: Data Sources
The real price of jet fuel comes from the PPI and the Oil and Petroleum Statistical Annual.
First it is scaled to equal 1.00 for a -100 in 1978. Then the price of fuel for the other types of 707s
are adjusted by using their relative fuel intensity in Table 1, dividing by 1.081 for -300B, 1.035 for
the -300C, and .946 for the -300. The price index of durable goods is the durable goods deflator
divided by the gdp deflator in the Economic Report of the President. The financial data for each
company and the average flight stage length come from Air Carrier Financial Statistics, and the Air
Carrier Traffic Statistics of the Civil Aviation Board (CAB). The cost of capital is a yearly average of
the quarterly data from Kopcke which is listed in Berndt (1990).
The fuel cost of one available seat mile is derived by taking the average available seat miles
per hour for the given carrier and plane type in a given year, dividing by the average gallons of fuel
consumed per hour divided by the average price paid per gallon for that plane (if the carrier has both
international and domestic flights and the cost of fuel is different, the average price weighted by the
total hours flown of each type of service is used). The nominal cost per ASM is then scaled by the
GDP deflator. If the total hours flown by one type of aircraft for a carrier in a given year is too
small, the CAB does not report the statistics. This is usually the case when a carrier has one or two
of a given type of plane remaining. To impute the cost of fuel it is necessary to have the fuel intensity
of the plane and the average price paid for fuel. An average is taken of the last three reported years
for the fuel economy and then the average fuel price for either the other types of 707, if available for
that carrier in that year or else the fuel cost for a similar plane like the 727-100 is used. Testing this
imputation procedure on years in which I do have data, shows that the results are almost always
within 5% of the true value. Further, by definition this is only relevant when there are few planes
remaining and their effect on the results is negligible.
It might be natural to question the use of Available Seat Miles (ASM) rather than Revenue
Passenger Miles (RPM) for the fuel economy calculations. It is standard practice among airlines,
however, to use ASM because of the variability in revenues and passengers. A detailed demonstration
that ASM is a better measure is given in James (1982). Just to make sure, though, I have done the
same estimation above but taking the average load factor before and after deregulation (about 53%
and then 60%) and scaled the fuel costs into passenger miles but the fuel estimates are almost exactly
the same and not statistically different at all.
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Figure 3: Real Price of Jet Fuel
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Figure 5: Kaplan-Meier Hazard Rates
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Figure 6a: Integrated Hazard for 100
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